CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Bangui Declaration on Joint Actions

Introduction and National Environment

Delivering for the people, Prefecture by Prefecture

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Why the Bangui Declaration

"Policy that Delivers", Prefecture by Prefecture

The Bangui Declaration on Joint Actions is an initiative that brings citizenry, companies, investors and the Central African Republic's public agencies together around one practical aim: improvements that citizens can see to their daily lives.

The Declaration is built in the belief that we have a direct and active part to play in meeting the essential needs of the people of the Central African Republic. Clinics with medicines, classrooms with desks and teachers, roads that reach markets, seeds in the ground before the rains, as well as light and clean water in secondary towns are the measures by which to be judged. With a coordinating representative in each prefecture, the initiative is designed to reach well beyond the capital and to serve communities across the whole country.

Background

Whilst the Central African Republic's economy is recovering, and with that recovery comes a real opportunity to turn progress into everyday gains. Daily life is still constrained however by poverty, food insecurity, weak infrastructure, limited access to electricity, and stretched health and education services. The situation in parts of the country remains fragile, but the foundations for steady improvement are now in place.

The Bangui Declaration rises to these challenges with a focused programme of visible delivery. It is designed to complement the government's National Development Plan 2024–2028. The spirit of the approach rests on three principles:

- **Fewer promises, more completions:** finish small and medium projects already under way.
- **Accelerate transformative projects:** centred on energy, transport and agriculture.
- **Visible accountability:** a Task Force that tracks progress.

The Declaration will give to CAR four roles: a place of dialogue between government, industry and investors; a place for peace, supporting stability through visible improvements in daily life; a platform for partnership; and a gateway for recovery and development.

Objectives

The Declaration's objectives fall into seven programme areas: six bring practical improvements to daily life, and the seventh, present the nation to the world (InvestCAR) as a location to understand opportunities and to invest.

Why the private sector matters

Business brings what lasting delivery needs most: practical skills, supply chains, equipment, investment and the discipline of finishing what is started. By working through a single, coordinated Task Force, companies and investors can multiply the impact of their individual programmes, share knowledge and direct effort to where it is needed most - in every prefecture, nationwide.

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Programme area	What it sets out to deliver
Development projects	Review approved projects that are unfinished or undelivered, assess progress and outstanding commitments, remove barriers and put completion first.
Primary healthcare	Essential medicines in clinics, a guaranteed package of maternal, child and emergency medicines, assisted births, vaccination, malnutrition screening, more community health workers and solar-powered facilities.
Schools and young people	Repaired classrooms, restored teacher presence, expanded school meals, desks and textbooks (including donated books), and skills training in construction, agriculture, electricity, mechanics and digital services.
Community roads and transport	Rehabilitated roads that cut travel times to markets, temporary jobs through labour-intensive repair of feeder roads, bridges, drains and streets, and completed maintenance contracts.
Food and farmers	Improved seeds and tools before planting seasons, storage centres, support for small cassava, maize, rice, livestock and vegetable processors, and school-feeding supplies bought from local farmers.
Electricity and water	Solar mini-grids for health centres, markets and schools in secondary towns, repaired boreholes and water systems, and maintenance contracts so new assets are looked after.
InvestCAR	Attract Inward Investment, promote Exports, Address Public affairs, organise Executive trade missions by invitation, speak at targeted global events and present a programme of Road shows in essential countries.

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SECTION 2 OF 3

Conditions Nationally

Conditions: National

The Central African Republic in late 2026 is a country moving out of conflict, but unevenly. Some prefectures are recovering and ready for development. Others are still caught up in armed violence, cross-border spillover and mass displacement. This article draws on the research behind the Prefecture Development Briefing to describe conditions across all 20 prefectures, region by region, as of September 2026.

The national picture

The crisis that began in 2013 left deep damage. Schools, health centres and public buildings were looted or destroyed across much of the country, and communities were divided along religious and ethnic lines. Many Muslim traders and herders who fled have never returned, and the trading and livestock networks they ran have been hollowed out.

Recent years have brought real progress. Fighting slowed in 2025 for the first time in years, and national elections were held in December 2025. Major armed groups have entered peace processes: the UPC signed a ceasefire in April 2025, the 3R signed an agreement in N'Djamena in April 2025, and the MPC followed in November 2025. Disarmament of all three, and of the FPRC in the north-east, is now under way. In June 2026, MINUSCA, the UN peacekeeping mission, began handing bases in stabilised areas over to national authorities.

The needs, however, remain immense. About 2.4 million people, 38% of the population, needed humanitarian aid in 2025, and roughly one in three people is acutely food insecure. Around 428,000 people remain internally displaced, living in 77 displacement sites across the country. The 2026 humanitarian plan seeks about US$264 million for 1.3 million people, but it is so underfunded that agencies are cutting to the bare minimum. Protection monitoring has shrunk by about 30%.

Three features shape conditions almost everywhere:

- **Security is now largely in national hands.** That brings new risks, because soldiers, gendarmes and Russian-linked security personnel are themselves reported to commit abuses in several prefectures.
- **Conflict between farmers and herders is the most widespread source of violence.** The country recorded 601 transhumance-related incidents in the first half of 2026, mostly triggered by herds destroying crops.
- **The country is landlocked and isolated.** Fuel arrives through Cameroon and Congo, national power generation is about 100 MW against estimated demand of 250 MW, and many roads become impassable in the rainy season.

Bangui and its hinterland

Bangui. The capital is politically stable after the elections, but crime has replaced war as the main threat, and the commercial district is a target for banditry. Nearly 40% of residents live in poverty, and about 94,000 internally displaced people live in the prefecture. Basic systems are fragile. In January 2026, breakdowns at the Boali hydro plant left the city without electricity or tap water for more than a week, and replacement parts take at least six months to arrive from China. Fuel shortages in April and November 2025 and July 2026 pushed up

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fares and living costs. Around 5,000 people in Kolongo and M'poko Bac have lived in standing water since the July 2023 floods, and riverside districts flood every rainy season.

Ombella-M'Poko. The prefecture surrounding Bangui is home to the Boali plants on which the capital depends, yet violence reaches close to the city. Farmer–herder killings occurred at Bouboui, 35 km from Bangui, in January 2025 and near Sakoussa, 18 km away, in February 2026. 3R fighters operate this far south. In March 2026, about 50 of them abducted two men on the Boali–Poste road, and one was killed when his family could not pay a ransom of 3 million CFA francs (about US$3,000). The prefecture ranks among the worst for illegal checkpoints, extortion and mob justice linked to witchcraft accusations. A rehabilitated court opened in Bossembélé in February 2026.

Lobaye. Security is stable, and MINUSCA handed over its Mbaïki base in June 2026. The core problem is rural poverty. Most people are coffee farmers, few children reach secondary school, and many die for lack of medical care. In June 2026, the government declared a cholera outbreak in the Mbaïki and Bimbo health districts, with 197 confirmed cases and 24 deaths. Industrial and illegal logging is clearing the forest that Aka communities depend on, without compensation or recognition of their land rights. Wagner has extended its control over mining sites around Boda.

The west and north-west

The western prefectures are among the calmer parts of the country. The north-west, bordering Chad and Cameroon, is where the 3R armed group and conflict between farmers and herders do the most harm.

Mambéré. Around Carnot, the prefecture is relatively calm and features little in recent conflict reporting. Its mining economy, however, is controlled by outside armed actors. Across CAR, control of mines passed from Wagner to the Russian defence ministry's Africa Corps after 2023, and production is neither monitored nor regulated. The lifting of the Kimberley Process diamond embargo in 2024 has not yet improved miners' incomes.

Mambéré-Kadéï. A September 2026 UN report describes the Berbérati area as broadly calm. Daily UN police patrols on the main roads have restored traders' confidence. Even so, the prefecture ranks among the worst for illegal checkpoints, extortion and abductions, and attacks on herders and traders continue on the Berbérati–Sosso-Nakombo road. Dialogue on cattle corridors has eased long-standing farmer–herder disputes.

Nana-Mambéré. 3R fighters around Bouar are being disarmed in stages, and MINUSCA handed over its Dilapoko base in June 2026. Remaining 3R members still abduct civilians and tax livestock illegally. In early 2026, four artisanal miners were killed at Zotoua-Banguerem. Justice is improving, with court open days and prison reform in Bouar.

Sangha-Mbaéré. The south-western forest prefecture largely escaped the conflict. Conservation is a major employer, with about 340 staff working in protected areas, and gorilla tourism reopened at Bayanga in 2025. State services are very thin. In February 2026, health care at Nola prison had stopped entirely, and there was no water or electricity.

Lim-Pendé. Despite the peace deal, the 3R still holds armed positions across rural areas. Sexual violence is the defining abuse. In February 2026, every case of conflict-related sexual violence attributed to signatory armed groups nationwide involved the 3R in Lim-Pendé. Soldiers, sometimes with Russian-linked personnel, are also reported to make arbitrary arrests and extort civilians.

Ouham-Pendé. Seventy-three 3R fighters disarmed at Koui in March 2026. That same month, however, Ouham-Pendé and Lim-Pendé together recorded more human rights violations than any other area, driven by 19 cases of child recruitment by the 3R. The group has also blocked humanitarian access.

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Ouham. Around Bossangoa, residual rebels and abusive security operations both persist. A joint operation by soldiers, Russian-linked personnel and UPC intermediaries looted a health centre and burned houses at Bowaye in March 2026. Fighters waited at Kouki for a year before a disarmament operation was scheduled.

Ouham-Fafa. The prefecture holds 25 of the country's 77 displacement sites, the largest concentration in CAR, around Batangafo, Bouca and Kabo. Some residents have been displaced for a decade. Health care depends heavily on MSF, which runs Batangafo's 150-bed hospital.

The centre

Central CAR is where the peace process has advanced furthest, as both the UPC and MPC move through disarmament. It is also where the handover from MINUSCA to national forces is most visible.

Kémo. MINUSCA handed its Dékoa base to the government in June 2026, making Kémo a consolidation prefecture where security rests with national forces. Farmer–herder tension is the main live threat, and violence east of Sibut displaced residents in early 2025. Sibut's district hospital is a bright spot: with World Bank support, it has a new maternity unit. Cassava, groundnuts and sesame are the main crops, but rainy-season flooding cuts farms off from markets.

Nana-Grébizi. The MPC agreed in November 2025 to end its activities here, and its disarmament resumed in mid-2026. Kidnappings and armed movements persist around Kaga-Bandoro, and herds continue to destroy fields. MINUSCA is closing its Mbrès base, which the Protection Cluster warns could worsen civilian protection. Kaga-Bandoro still had eight displacement sites as of March 2026.

Ouaka. The UPC began disarming in July 2025, and in March 2026 former UPC and 3R fighters started training as forest and water rangers. Mining is the main flashpoint. On 26 March 2026, a self-defence group reportedly operating alongside Russian-linked personnel killed at least four artisanal miners at Ndassima. State forces levy illegal taxes at checkpoints around Bambari, and the prefecture still has 12 displacement sites.

Basse-Kotto. Security has largely been restored since the UPC ceasefire, and MINUSCA handed over its Pombolo base in June 2026. Refugees have been returning to Alindao since 2025 and need housing, land and livelihoods. Schools, health centres and administrative buildings in Mobaye and elsewhere remain wrecked from the conflict. Livelihoods depend on subsistence farming and river trade on the Ubangi.

The north-east and south-east

The east is where conditions are most severe. Sudan's war is spilling across the north-eastern border, and fighting with the Azande militia AAKG has made the south-east the most violent part of the country.

Bamingui-Bangoran. Security around Ndélé is improving but volatile. Nine FPRC and Siriri fighters demobilised in February 2026, and MINUSCA handed over its Bamingui base in June 2026. That same February, however, a grenade was thrown into an international NGO's compound. Sudanese refugees are dispersed across the prefecture. There is no functioning prison, and services rely heavily on NGOs.

Vakaga. This is now one of CAR's most acute crises. As of June 2026, the Korsi site in Birao held about 24,800 Sudanese refugees, roughly a quarter of the prefecture's population, with 52 people sharing each latrine. Even before the influx, 46% of people were food insecure. Fighters from Sudan's Rapid Support Forces have made incursions and recruited local youth. On 30 June 2026, an attack on the border town of Am-Dafock displaced about 17,000 people. Vakaga recorded more incidents against aid workers than any other prefecture in January–July 2026.

Haute-Kotto. Russian forces control rich mining sites around Bria and Sam-Ouandja, and miners report that terror is used to enforce a monopoly. Joseph Kony's LRA faction remains present. In February 2026, the

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prefecture recorded more grave violations against children than any other, after children escaping the LRA reached Sam-Ouandja. Clashes with Sudanese armed elements have also reached the north of the prefecture.

Mbomou. The AAKG crisis is spilling over from Haut-Mbomou, with an attack on an army detachment at Dembia in February 2026. Mbomou has nine displacement sites at Rafaï, Bangassou and Bakouma. Aid operations have been temporarily suspended after attacks on humanitarian teams. The Protection Cluster ranks Mbomou among the three prefectures at highest risk of attacks on civilians.

Haut-Mbomou. This is currently CAR's most violent prefecture. Fighting between the army and the AAKG has continued since the December 2025 elections, with abuses reported by all sides, including state forces, Russian-linked personnel and a resurgent LRA. About 30,000 people are displaced in the south-east, and the 300 km road from Bangassou to Zémio takes 16–17 hours. Enrolment at Zémio's secondary school fell from 992 to 72 students in a year. There are some signs of hope: about 700 people returned from DRC after a river crossing reopened in February 2026, and the government has signalled openness to dialogue.

What the picture tells us

Taken together, conditions across the 20 prefectures point to five realities that any development effort must take into account.

1. **Conditions differ sharply between prefectures.** Basse-Kotto, Kémo, Lobaye and the western prefectures are ready for recovery. The north-west and centre are in transition, with disarmament under way. The east remains in crisis. A single national approach would not fit any of them well.
2. **The state is returning, but it is not yet trusted everywhere.** MINUSCA's handover is a milestone. However, reports of abuses and illegal checkpoints by national forces and Russian-linked personnel show that security and justice must improve alongside services.
3. **Basic services are fragile and often depend on outsiders.** Hospitals in Batangafo, Ndélé and Bria rely on NGOs, prisons fail basic standards, and Bangui's power and water can fail for a week at a time. Disease, including cholera at home and Ebola across the river in DRC, remains a constant threat.
4. **Natural wealth is not yet benefiting local people.** Diamonds, gold and timber are concentrated in prefectures where outside armed actors control the sites or forest communities are being dispossessed.
5. **Humanitarian funding is shrinking just as recovery becomes possible.** Agencies are pulling back from stabilised areas, leaving a gap that development programmes must fill if recent gains are to last.

This is the starting point for the Bangui Declaration. The accompanying Prefecture Development Briefing turns these conditions into priorities and a phased plan for each prefecture.

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SECTION 3 OF 3

A Country at a Turning Point

Central African Republic

The Central African Republic enters late 2026 in a stronger position than at any point in more than a decade. Fighting slowed in 2025 for the first time in years, elections were held in December 2025, and the three armed groups that did most damage in the west and centre (the 3R, the UPC and the MPC) have all signed agreements to lay down their arms. In June 2026 the UN mission, MINUSCA, began handing its bases to the national government in areas judged stabilised.

None of this makes the country safe or prosperous yet. Some 2.4 million people, 38% of the population, needed humanitarian aid in 2025, and the response is sharply underfunded. The question now is not whether CAR can recover, but who will do the specific work that turns a fragile pause into lasting change.

A hard inheritance

CAR's crises have been cumulative. The Séléka seizure of power in 2013 and the anti-Balaka backlash split communities along religious lines. Muslims were driven out of Mbaïki entirely, sheltered for months inside the churches of Carnot and Berbérati, and were besieged in Bangassou's Tokoyo district in 2017. Even displacement camps became targets: Kaga-Bandoro in 2016, then Alindao and Batangafo in 2018.

Armed groups then entrenched themselves around the country's wealth. The diamond fields of Bria and the Ndassima gold deposit in Ouaka, which the government values at about US$2.8 billion, funded rebels for years. The 2020 election crisis brought the CPC rebel coalition to the approaches of Bangui, and government forces, backed by Russian-linked personnel, retook most major towns only in 2021.

The legacy is a state that is thin outside the capital. Courts, prisons, schools and clinics were looted or abandoned, and in many places organisations such as MSF became the health system.

Where things stand in 2026

The picture is mixed but moving in the right direction. Lobaye, Basse-Kotto, Kémo and Sangha-Mbaéré are broadly stable, and refugees returned to Alindao throughout 2025. In Mambéré-Kadéï, daily UN police patrols on market roads have restored traders' confidence. Former UPC and 3R fighters began training as forest and water rangers in March 2026.

Serious pressures remain, and an honest account must name them:

- **The south-east and far north are in crisis.** Haut-Mbomou is now the most violent prefecture, as the Azande AAKG militia fights the army. In Vakaga, about 24,800 Sudanese refugees at Korsi equal a quarter of the local population, and Sudan's RSF fighters have crossed the border.
- **Disarmament is incomplete.** 3R units in the north-west still tax livestock, abduct civilians and recruit children.
- **Farmer–herder conflict is the leading driver of violence.** There were 601 transhumance-related incidents in the first half of 2026.

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- **Security forces can be part of the problem.** Illegal checkpoints, extortion and abuses by soldiers and Russian-linked personnel are reported in several prefectures, and mining output is neither monitored nor regulated.
- **Basic services are fragile.** Bangui has about 100 MW of generation against demand of 250 MW. A failure at Boali in January 2026 left the capital without power or water for over a week.

About 428,000 people remain internally displaced across 77 sites, and the 2026 humanitarian plan is so underfunded that agencies are cutting to the bare minimum.

A plan built prefecture by prefecture

The Bangui Declaration on Joint Actions contributes to the national direction, and its implementation plan turns it into concrete priorities for each of CAR's 20 prefectures. Needs differ sharply by region. Bangui needs reliable power, clean water and flood defences; Ouham-Fafa needs homes for families who have lived in 25 displacement sites, some for a decade; Vakaga needs an all-season road so not cut off for six months of every year.

Five themes recur however across the plan: finishing disarmament with real livelihoods; mapped, agreed transhumance corridors; accountable security and working courts as MINUSCA withdraws; fair and transparent mining; and reconnecting isolated regions. To keep delivery focused, the Declaration proposes a respected, non-aligned representative for each prefecture who reports monthly.

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